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HABEAS CORPUS-LIMITED REVIEW
FOR ACTUAL INNOCENCE
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Herrera v. Collins,I the United States Supreme Court held that
absent an accompanying constitutional violation, a claim of actual
innocence by a death penalty petitioner is not grounds for federal
habeas corpus relief. Although ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, refused to authorize review of Herrera's claim, he dis-
posed of the case by assuming, arguendo, that the Constitution would
prohibit the execution of a petitioner who made a truly persuasive
showing of actual innocence. The Court offered neither a constitu-
tional rationale for its hypothetical treatment nor a standard by
which evidence of actual innocence would be measured.
This Note examines the history of federal habeas corpus review
and argues that the Court logically extended precedent in a manner
consistent with its current position on federal habeas corpus:
habeas relief is to be granted only in cases of egregious procedural
error in order to encourage the finality of state court decisions.
This Note further argues that the Court's hypothetical argument is
in line with recent decisions that make available narrow exceptions
for substantive review in truly extraordinary circumstances. Finally,
this Note argues that a truly compelling showing of actual innocence
would require the Court to adopt a substantive interpretation of
habeas relief in order to justify its review of the claim.
II. BACKGROUND
A. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS JURISPRUDENCE
The "Great Writ" of habeas corpus, "the most celebrated writ
in the English Law, ' 2 offers protection against "illegal restraint or
confinement. ' 3 Habeas corpus relief is based in the principle "that
in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the
1 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
2 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 129.
3 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1962).
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judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be
shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the
individual is entitled to his immediate release." 4 Habeas corpus
protection originated at common law5 and is guaranteed by the
Constitution, which provides that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in the Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."6 In addi-
tion, Congress created a habeas remedy for federal prisoners held
"in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United
States" in its first grant ofjurisdiction to the federal courts in 1789. 7
Initially, habeas protection existed only for cases in which the
legal process leading to imprisonment8 or the jurisdiction of the
sentencing tribunal9 were challenged. In 1867, Congress extended
federal habeas corpus protection to prisoners held in state cus-
tody. I The Court noted that the congressional act "brings within
the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every
possible case of [de]privation of liberty contrary to the National
Constitution, treaties or laws. It is impossible to widen this
jurisdiction.""
Despite the stated expansion, habeas protection continued to
be applied only to cases in which the defendant alleged that the sen-
tencing court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction. 12 The
Court extended the reach of federal habeas review during the later
part of the nineteenth century, however, by changing the circum-
stances under which the lack of state court jurisdiction could be
found.' 3 Even after this shift, federal habeas courts sat not as fact
finders but as guarantors of fundamental constitutional rights. Jus-
tice Holmes noted that "what we have to deal with [on habeas re-
4 Id. at 402.
5 Id. at 400.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cI. 2.
7 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82 (1789).
8 McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1461 (1991) (citing Exparte Wells, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 307 (1856)).
9 Id. (citing Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-03 (1830)).
10 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867) (codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-
55 (1988)).
11 Exparte McCardle, 73 U.S. 318, 325-26 (1867).
12 See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 33.01(b), at 831 (2d ed. 1986).
13 See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chart of
the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 103-04 (1959) (explaining the "long process of expan-
sion of the concept of lack ofjurisdiction"); Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 176-78 (1873)
(lack ofjurisdiction found for violation of prohibition against double jeopardy); Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879) (lack of jurisdiction found when statute upon
which prosecution was based was determined unconstitutional).
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view] is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the
question whether their constitutional rights have been preserved." 14
In Hyde v. Shine,15 the Court further articulated its position on evi-
dentiary review when it held that "[i]n the Federal courts.... it is
well settled that upon habeas corpus the court will not weigh the evi-
dence, although if there is an entire lack of evidence to support the
accusation the court may order his discharge."1 6
In 1915, the Court dramatically increased the scope of habeas
corpus in Frank v. Mangum, 17 in which the Court held that habeas
relief is available whenever the state, "supplying no corrective pro-
cess, . . . deprives the accused of his life or liberty without due pro-
cess of law."' 8 The Warren Court continued this shift toward
increased availability of habeas corpus in the next phase of habeas
litigation after World War II.19 Among the issues decided by the
Warren Court were which claims could be heard upon habeas
corpus. In Fay v. Noia,20 the Warren Court set the standard that a
claim not raised in state court could be raised before a habeas court
as long as the petitioner had not deliberately bypassed state proce-
dural rules. The Court created this "deliberate bypass" rule
because "a forfeiture of remedies does not legitimize the unconsti-
tutional conduct by which [a] conviction was procured." 21
In keeping with its expansive interpretation, the Warren Court
also authorized federal courts to engage in fact-finding independent
of the state court upon habeas review. Townsend v. Sain22 involved a
challenge to a murder conviction based on a confession obtained
after the police had injected the defendant with "truth serum." 23
The Court held that federal courts are required to hold factual hear-
ings when facts are in dispute or when the defendant did not receive
a full and fair hearing in state court.24 Specifically, the Court held
that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas
applicant when:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hear-
14 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923).
15 199 U.S. 62 (1904).
16 Id. at 84.
17 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
18 Id. at 335.
19 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDICTION § 15.2 at 684-85 (1989) (discuss-
ing the causes for changes in constitutional interpretation that led to a new habeas
jurisprudence).
20 372 U.S. 391 (1963), abrogated by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
21 Id. at 428.
22 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
23 Id. at 303.
24 Id. at 313.
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ing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the
record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state
court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence, (5) the material facts were
not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any rea-
son it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas ap-
plicant a full and fair fact hearing.2 5
The Court suggested that deference should be paid to a state court's
fact-finding; new evidentiary hearings should be held only if there is
reason to doubt that the habeas applicant had a fair hearing that
resulted in reliable findings.2 6 For the first time, however, federal
courts were required "to engage in independent fact-finding under
specific circumstances." 2 7
The Townsend Court elaborated upon its position relating to
newly discovered evidence. The Court explained that federal courts
must grant an evidentiary hearing when newly discovered evidence
related to the constitutionality of a petitioner's detention is alleged.
Where newly discovered evidence is alleged in a habeas application,
evidence which could not reasonably have been presented to the state
trier of facts, the federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing. Of
course, such evidence must bear upon the constitutionality of the ap-
plicant's detention; the existence merely of newly discovered evidence
relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on
federal habeas corpus. Also, the district judge is under no obligation
to grant a hearing upon a frivolous or incredible allegation of newly
discovered evidence. 28
Since Townsend, however, the Court has substantially narrowed
the ability of death row inmates to obtain habeas review. The Bur-
ger Court adopted a standard very different than the "deliberate by-
pass" criteria articulated in Fay. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 29 the Burger
Court held that a habeas petitioner must show "cause" for not hav-
ing proceeded in state court and "prejudice" by not being allowed a
federal court hearing before a claim that was not presented in state
court will be heard.3 0 In Murray v. Carrier,3 1 the Court recognized an
exception to the "cause and prejudice" standard for "extraordinary
case[s], where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent .... ,,3
25 Id. (emphasis added).
26 Id. at 318.
27 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 15.5 at 719.
28 Townsend, 372 U.S. at 317.
29 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
30 Id. at 90-91.
31 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
32 Id. at 496.
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B. THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXCEPTION
The "actual innocence" exception, also referred to as the "fun-
damental miscarriage of justice" exception, stems from the lan-
guage of the federal habeas statute,3 3 which, prior to amendment in
1966, allowed a judge to deny successive claims34 without a hearing
as long as the judge was "satisfied that the ends of justice will not be
served by such inquiry."3 5 Although that language was omitted in the
statute's amended version, the Court retained but substantially nar-
rowed the actual innocence exception in Kuhlmann v. Wilson,3 6 its
first of three habeas decisions in the 1986 term. The plurality in
Kuhlmann found that "[t]he ends of justice require federal courts to
entertain [successive] petitions only where the prisoner supple-
ments his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual
innocence. ' 37 Justice Brennan objected to this limitation in his dis-
senting opinion. He argued that
[d]espite the plurality's intimations, we simply have never held that
federal habeas review of properly presented, nondefaulted constitu-
tional claims is limited either to constitutional protections that ad-
vance the accuracy of the fact-finding process at trial or is available
solely to prisoners who can make out a colorable showing of factual
innocence. 38
Despite this objection, in Murray v. Carrier,39 decided shortly af-
ter Kuhlmann, the Supreme Court held that the actual innocence ex-
ception to the cause and prejudice requirement applied to
procedurally defaulted claims as well.40 The Carrier Court found
that defense counsel's inadvertent failure to raise a claim in a notice
of appeal did not allow it to be heard on habeas review unless the
error amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.41 Under the
relevant state law, the state supreme court would hear only those
issues raised in the petition for appeal.42 Accordingly, the state
33 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1988).
34 A successive claim is one that raises grounds identical to one heard and decided
on its merits in a previous petition. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986).
35 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1988) as quoted before its amendment in Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 11 n.5 (1963) (emphasis added).
36 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
37 Id. at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court uses "factual innocence"
and "actual innocence" interchangeably.
38 Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
40 Id. at 496-97. A procedurally defaulted claim is one in which the petitioner failed
to comply with state procedural rules in bringing the claim. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S.
Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992).
41 Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496-97.
42 Id. at 482.
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supreme court had refused to address the issue.43
The United States Supreme Court, applying the Sykes standard,
found that there was not sufficient cause to permit the defendant to
raise the issue in the federal habeas proceeding. However, Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, found an exception to the cause
requirement. The Carrier Court explained that "in an extraordinary
case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court
may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the
procedural default." 44 Carrier's petition was remanded with orders
to dismiss unless the appellate court found facts that established the
petitioner's actual innocence. 45
In Smith v. Murray,46 its third habeas decision of the 1986 term,
the Court applied the actual innocence exception to the sentencing
phase of a capital case.47 In Smith, the defendant challenged the ad-
mission of a psychiatrist's testimony regarding the defendant's dis-
cussion of his conduct in other instances.48 The state courts refused
to hear the issue on appeal because the defendant did not assert this
claim in the initial proceeding, as required by state law.49 The de-
fendant then sought habeas relief. The United States Supreme
Court found that "the mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the
factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim despite
recognizing it, does not constitute cause for a procedural default." 50
The Smith Court expressly rejected the argument that more lib-
eral habeas review should be available in capital cases. 5 1 The Court,
however, explained that the failure to demonstrate cause would not
preclude habeas review if the defendant could show that he is likely
actually innocent. 52 The Court acknowledged that its concern with
actual innocence "does not translate easily into the context of an
alleged error at the sentencing phase of a trial on a capital of-
fense."' 53 Nevertheless, the Court's standard required the prisoner
to demonstrate a "substantial claim that [counsel's] alleged [proce-
43 Id.
44 Id. at 496.
45 Id. at 497.
46 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
47 Id. at 537.
48 Id. at 531. The defendant, accused of raping and brutally killing a woman, told the
court-appointed psychiatrist "that he had once torn the clothes off a girl on a school bus
before deciding not to carry out his original plan to rape her." Id. at 530.
49 Id. at 533.
50 Id. at 535.
51 Id. at 538.




dural] error undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing de-
termination. '54 The Court found that the petitioner did not meet
his burden to show actual innocence of the death penalty because
the "alleged constitutional error neither precluded the development
of true facts nor resulted in the admission of false ones." 55
The Court both clarified and further narrowed the "actual inno-
cence" exception, which allows the granting of federal habeas
corpus relief without a demonstration of cause and prejudice, in
Sawyer v. Whitley. 56 In Sawyer, the Court finally articulated a defini-
tion of "actual innocence" for death penalty cases. In an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court stated that a habeas petitioner
can show actual innocence only by presenting "dear and convincing
evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror
would have found him eligible for the death penalty under the appli-
cable state law."' 57 In a successive petition, the defendant in Sawyer
argued that evidence impeaching the testimony of one witness for
the prosecution as well as statements made by the witness' four-year
old son were unconstitutionally withheld from the jury during the
sentencing phase of his trial. 58 Under applicable state law, imposing
the death penalty required a finding "beyond a reasonable doubt
that at least one aggravating circumstance exists and ... considera-
tion of any mitigating circumstances." 59 The Court refused to ad-
mit the alleged evidence of mitigating circumstances, explaining
that the evidence offered "fail[ed] to show that the petitioner is ac-
tually innocent of the death penalty to which he has been
54 Id at 539. The actual innocence exception was considered in over 100 cases in the
five years following Smith v. Murray. No death penalty determination was found to meet
the standard. Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1200 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 361 (1992).
55 Smith, 477 U.S. at 538.
56 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
57 Id. at 2517. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens noted the decidedly heavy
burden that this standard places on those seeking to challenge capital sentences. Justice
Stevens remarked:
While a defendant raising defaulted claims in a non-capital case must show that
constitutional error 'probably resulted' in a miscarriage ofjustice, a capital defend-
ant must present 'clear and convincing evidence' that no reasonable juror would
find him eligible for the death penalty. It is heartlessly perverse to impose a more
stringent standard of proof to avoid a miscarriage ofjustice in a capital case than in
a noncapital case.
Id. at 2533 (Stevens, J., concurring).
58 Id. at 2524.
59 Id at 2520 n.9. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder for brutally attack-
ing a woman and then setting her body on fire. Upon sentencing, the valid aggravating
circumstances found by the jury were "that the murder was committed in the course of





Until Herrera v. Collins,6' the Supreme Court had never consid-
ered a habeas petition unaccompanied by an underlying procedural
error in violation of the Constitution. Unlike the above cited cases,
Herrera did not challenge the state court's finding of guilt based on
the evidence presented at trial. Instead, in his habeas appeal, Her-
rera argued that new evidence, not available at trial, proved him in-
nocent despite the state court's finding.62 The Court's decision in
Jackson v. Virginia63 "comes as close to authorizing evidentiary re-
view of a state court conviction on federal habeas as any of [the
Court's] cases." 64 The Jackson Court held that if the procedural pre-
requisites for challenging a conviction have been satisfied, a peti-
tioner is entitled to habeas relief only if review of the evidence from
trial reveals that no rational trier of fact could have found guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt.65 The Jackson Court made clear that this
standard is not a subjective one. The Court must ask "whether, af-
ter viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 66 The Court
reasoned that applying such an objective criterion would impinge
"upon 'jury' discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the
fundamental protection of due process of law." 67
In Herrera, the Court considered whether habeas review is re-
quired by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when a death
row convict proffers newly discovered evidence alleging actual
innocence. 68
III. FACTS
Before midnight on September 29, 1981, a passerby discovered
the body of David Rucker, a Texas Department of Public Safety of-
60 Id. at 2524.
61 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
62 Id. at 859.
63 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
64 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 861.
65 Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324.
66 Id. at 319.
67 Id.
68 The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No State shall . . . de-




ficer, on a desolate stretch of highway near Los Fresnos, Texas. 69
Officer Rucker's body was found beside his patrol car with a bullet
in his head.70
Minutes thereafter, Los Fresnos Police Officer Enrique Car-
risalez observed a car speeding along the same route, away from the
location where the body had been discovered.7 1 Carrisalez chased
the speeding vehicle, 72 accompanied in his patrol car by Enrique
Hernandez.7 3 The vehicle pulled over.7 4 Officer Carrisalez stopped
behind it and walked toward the speeder's car, flashlight in hand.7 5
The driver opened his car door, spoke to Carrisalez, and then fired
at the officer.76 Nine days later, after extensive surgery, Officer Car-
risalez died from his wound. 77
Hernandez watched the shooting from inside the patrol car and
immediately took cover.78 When Hernandez next peered over the
dashboard, he saw a wounded Carrisalez fire four shots as the car
sped away.7 9 Hernandez then radioed in a description of the
shooter and his vehicle.8 0 While in pursuit, Officer Carrisalez had
called in the license plate number of the car he followed as "WBZ
143"; the number was later corrected to "XBZ 143."81 Local police
recognized the descriptions as those of Leonel Herrera and a car he
often drove.8 2 After obtaining and executing an arrest warrant, the
officers located the vehicle.8 3 The car, registered to Herrera's live-
in girlfriend, had license plate number "XBZ 143."84 She allowed
the police to search the car.8 5 The officers found personal papers
69 Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 857 (1993).
70 Id
71 Id.; Herrera v. Texas, 682 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1131 (1985).
72 113 S. Ct. at 857.
73 Although Hernandez was a civilian, he frequently accompanied officers on night
patrol. Hernandez had military training in aircraft identification, and, in the eight years
in which he had ridden with police officers, had witnessed several arrests. Respondent's
Brief at 7, Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (No. 91-7328).




78 Herrera v. Collins, 904 F.2d 944, 946 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 925 (1990).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Herrera v. Texas, 682 S.W.2d 313, 316 (rex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1131 (1985). The record is unclear as to whether the mistake was made by Car-







belonging to Herrera, as well as some spent shotgun shells.86 In
addition, the left side of the car, the driver's seat, and floorboard
were blood-stained.8 7 Forensic tests subsequently showed that the
blood stains were type A, the same as that of Officer David Rucker.8 8
Herrera had type Oblood.8 9
Following a massive manhunt, 90 Leonel Torres Herrera was ar-
rested near Los Fresnos on October 6, 1981, and charged with the
capital murder of both Officers Rucker and Carrisalez. 9 l Upon
arrest, Herrera was taken to the Edinburg Police Department. 92
Several hours later, bleeding, unconscious, and paralyzed, Herrera
was taken to a hospital emergency room in a hearse.9 3 Exactly what
happened between Herrera's arrest and his departure for the hospi-
tal is subject to some debate. Known is that an officer attempted to
interrogate Herrera, who refused. 94 He told the police to read a
certain letter explaining the occurrence if they wanted to know what
happened, 9 5 and then requested counsel.96 Subsequently, with no
lawyer present, Assistant District Attorney Joe Hendley attempted
to interrogate Herrera. 97 He asked Herrera why he had killed Of-
ficer Rucker. 98 Herrera struck Hendley and continued to hit him
until "restrained" by several other officers. 9 9 Later, the police
found six envelopes among Herrera's belongings on which a letter
was written by Herrera; it essentially admitted and explained both
police killings.10 0
86 Id.
87 Id. at 316-17.
88 Id. at 317.
89 Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 857 (1993).
90 See Petitioner's Brief at 7, Herrera (No. 9 1-7328).
91 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 857.
92 Petitioner's Brief at 8, Herrera, (No. 91-7328).
93 Id.
94 Herrera v. Texas, 682 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex. Grim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1131 (1985).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 320. The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
97 Herrera, 682 S.W.2d at 320.
98 Id.
99 Id. Herrera's version is that Hendley tortured him by holding a lit cigarette lighter
under his nose. Petitiioner's Brief at 9, Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (No.
91-7328). In addition, the Brownsville Ledger reported the allegation by Herrera's wife
that he was pistol whipped and beaten while being questioned. Petitioner's Brief at 11,
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (No. 91-7328).
100 Herrera, 682 S.W.2d at 317. The letter read:
To whom it may concern: I am terribly sorry for those I have brought grief to their
lives. Who knows why? We cannot change the future's problems with problems
952 [Vol. 84
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At trial, Hernandez identified Herrera as the person who shot
Carrisalez. 10 1 He also positively identified Herrera's girlfriend's
car.102 Hernandez testified that there was only one person in the
assailant's vehicle on the night of the murder. 103 A declaration
made by Officer Carrisalez while he was in the hospital, in which he
identified Herrera as his attacker, was also admitted. 10 4 Further evi-
dence showed that Herrera's social security card was found near
Rucker's patrol car the night of his murder. 10 5 Herrera had keys to
his girlfriend's car in his pocket at the time of his arrest, and blood
splatters on his pants matched Officer Rucker's blood type.'0 6 Her-
rera was convicted of the capital murder of Officer Carrisalez and
sentenced to death in January 1982.107 In July of that year, Herrera
pleaded guilty to the murder of Officer David Rucker.108
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Herrera appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing, among
from the past. What I did was for a cause and purpose. One law runs others, and in
the world we live in, that's the way it is.
I am not a tormented person .... I believe in the law. What would it be without
this [sic] men that risk their lives for others, and that's what they should be doing-
protecting life, property, and the pursuit of happiness. Sometimes, the law gets too
involved with other things that profit them. The most laws that they make for peo-
ple to break them, in other words, to encourage crime.
What happened to Rucker was for a certain reason. I knew him as Mike Tatum. He
was in my business, and he violated some of its laws and suffered the penalty, like
the one you have for me when the time comes.
My personal life, which has been a conspiracy since my high school days, has noth-
ing to do with what has happened. The other officer that became part of our lives,
me and Rucker's (Tatum), that night had not to do in this [sic]. He was out to do
what he had to do, protect, but that's life. There's a lot of us that wear different
faces in lives every day, and that is what causes problems for all. [Unintelligible
word].
You have wrote all you want of my life, but think of yours, also. [Signed, Leonel
Herrera].
I have tapes and pictures to prove what I have said. I will prove my side if you
accept to listen. You [unintelligible word] freedom of speech, even a criminal has
that right. I will present myself if this is read word for word over the media, I will
turn myself in; if not, don't have millions of men out there workingjust on me while
others-robbers, rapists, or burglars-are taking advantage of the law's time. Ex-
cuse my spelling and writing. It's hard at times like this.
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 857-58 n.1 (1993).
1o1 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 857.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. Officer Carrisalez was on a respirator and in critical condition when he was
shown a single photograph of Herrera and was asked, "Is this the man who shot you?"
Upon seeing the picture Carrisalez became extremely agitated and excited. He re-
mained agitated and had to be sedated. Herrera, 682 S.W.2d at 319-20.






other things, that Hernandez' and Carrisalez' identifications were
unreliable10 9 and improperly admitted. 110 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals overruled all grounds of error and affirmed his
conviction."' The United States Supreme Court denied certio-
rari. 112 The state court then ordered that Herrera be executed by
lethal injection on August 16, 1985.113 On July 2, 1985, Herrera
applied for state habeas corpus relief, which was denied.' 14 Herrera
then petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas for federal habeas corpus relief and a stay of execu-
tion, again challenging the identifications of him made at trial."15
The federal district court granted the stay on August 12, 1985, but
later granted the state's motion for summary judgment and denied
Herrera federal habeas relief.116 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's conclusion that the pre-trial identifica-
tions of Herrera by Hernandez and Carrisalez were not
impermissibly suggestive1 17 so as to deny Herrera due process.118
The court denied the habeas petition, and the U.S. Supreme Court
refused certiorari. 19
Herrera next filed a second habeas petition in state court on
December 12, 1990, raising, among others, a claim of "actual inno-
cence" on newly discovered evidence. 120 Herrera presented the af-
fidavits of Hector Villarreal, an attorney who had represented
Herrera's brother, Raul Herrera, Sr., and ofJuan Franco Palacious,
one of Raul Sr.'s former cellmates. 12' Both claimed that Raul Sr.,
who died in 1984, told them that he-and not Leonel Herrera-had
killed Officers Rucker and Carrisalez. 122 The Texas district court
109 Herrera, 682 S.W.2d at 317.
110 Id. at 313. Herrera appealed on eight grounds of error. In four counts he claimed
that both pre-trial and in-court identifications of him violated his constitutional rights;
he objected to the admission of Carrisalez' dying declaration; he objected to the admis-
sion of threatening statements made by him that he alleged were the result of an interro-
gation in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and he objected to
testimony regarding an assault that occurred during his arraignment on an un-related
charge for which he was later acquitted. Herrera, 682 S.W.2d at 316.
111 Id. at 322.
112 Herrera v. Texas, 471 U.S. 1131 (1985).
113 Herrera v. Collins, 904 F.2d 944, 945 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 925
(1990).
114 Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 858 (1993).
115 Herrera, 904 F.2d at 945.
116 Id.
117 See supra note 104.
118 Id.






denied the petition on the ground that "no evidence at trial re-
motely suggest[ed] that anyone other than [petitioner] committed
the offense."' 123 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief
based on the trial court's conclusions, and vacated the stay of execu-
tion on May 29, 1991.124 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.1 25
In February 1992, Herrera filed a second habeas petition in fed-
eral court, raising five claims for relief' 26 including the allegation
that his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments because he was innocent of the murders of Rucker and Car-
risalez.127 With this writ, Herrera presented the additional affidavits
of Raul Herrera, Jr., Raul Sr.'s son, andJose Ybarra, a schoolmate of
both Herrera brothers. RaulJr.'s affidavit, dated January 29, 1992,
averred that he was in the car and witnessed his father shoot Officers
Rucker and Carrisalez.128 According to Raul Jr., Leonel Herrera
was not present. 129 Raul Jr. was nine years old at the time of the
murders.130 Ybarra, in an affidavit dated January 9, 1991, attested
that Raul Sr. told him in 1983 that he had shot the two police of-
ficers.'13 Herrera alleged that local police officers acted in violation
123 Id. (alteration in original).
124 Ex parte Herrera, 819 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Grim. App. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992).
125 Herrera v. Texas, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992).
126 Herrera raised the following claims in the instant habeas petition:
1.) The State's failure to reveal exculpatory evidence resulted in the conviction and
sentence of an innocent person, in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Petitioner is innocent, another person has confessed to the crime,
and the Petitioner's execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
2.) Petitioner was tried and sentenced to death for the murder of two police officers
by ajury whose members included a police officer in an office that investigated the
case, in violation of the Petitioner's Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
3.) During trial, recesses, and juror deliberation, juror-police officer Bressler was
armed, and at least one juror noticed; in addition, and contrary to his sworn state-
ments during voir dire, this officer knew one of the victims. These facts reveal that
Petitioner's conviction and death sentence occurred in violation of his Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
4.) Petitioner's sentencers were precluded from considering evidence which coun-
seled in favor of a sentence less than death, in violation of Petitioner's Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
5.) The trialjudge wrongfully refused to allow Petitioner to speak at all during Peti-
tioner's trial and capital sentencing proceeding, thereby violating Petitioner's fed-
eral Constitutional rights.
Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029, 1031 n.1 (5th Cir. 1992), afd, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
127 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 858.
128 Id. The testimony of Enrique Hernandez at trial, however, established that there
was only one person in the assailant's vehicle the night of the shooting. See supra note
103 and accompanying text.





of Brady v. Maryland 1 3 2 when they withheld this evidence, of which
they were fully aware.'33
The district court denied all relief on claims 2-5134 claiming
abuse of the habeas writ.' 35 The court initially denied Herrera's
Brady claim, which was incorporated into his first claim, stating that
Herrera failed to present "any evidence of withholding exculpatory
material by the prosecution."' 36 On reconsideration, however, the
district court concluded that sufficient facts were presented to re-
quire a hearing. Thus, "[i]n order to ensure that Petitioner can as-
sert his constitutional claims and out of a sense of fairness and due
process," the district court granted Herrera's request for a stay of
execution to enable him to present his claim of actual innocence in
state court.137
Collins, director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
appealed from the district court's stay of execution and moved the
Fifth Circuit for an order vacating the stay.138 The Fifth Circuit up-
held the district court's initial conclusion that Herrera neither al-
leged nor proffered facts that the prosecution withheld any
favorable evidence from him.13 9 The court of appeals held that ab-
sent an accompanying constitutional violation, Herrera's claim of
actual innocence was not cognizable under Townsend. 140 Townsend
held that "the existence merely of newly discovered evidence rele-
vant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on
federal habeas corpus."' 141 The Fifth Circuit thus granted Collins'
motion to vacate the stay of execution entered by the district
court. 14
2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
whether it violates due process or constitutes cruel and unusual
132 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady requires a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence
in his possession. The Court held that "the suppression by the prosecutor of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is mate-
rial either to guilt or to punishment .... " Id. at 87.
133 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 858-59.
134 See supra note 126.
135 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 859.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d. 1029, 1031 (5th Cir. 1992), arf'd, 113 S. Ct. 835
(1993).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1034.
141 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963). In Townsend, the Court held that a
federal habeas court must grant an evidentiary hearing in an allegation of newly discov-
ered evidence only when the evidence "bear[s] upon the constitutionality of the appli-
cant's detention." Id.
142 Herrera, 954 F.2d at 1034.
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punishment for a State to execute a person who, after conviction of
murder, alleges that newly discovered evidence proves his
innocence. 43
V. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 44 affirmed
the Fifth Circuit's decision by relying on the rule that absent an ac-
companying constitutional violation, a claim of actual innocence is
not a ground for federal habeas corpus relief.' 45 The Court thus
reaffirmed the principle that "federal habeas courts sit to ensure
that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitu-
tion-not to correct errors of fact."'146
Herrera asserted that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
"prohibit the execution of a person who is innocent of the crime for
which he was convicted."' 47 The Court countered, however, that
"innocence" and "guilt" are not arbitrary appellations but are in-
stead determined by judicial proceedings. 48 Thus, according to the
majority, Herrera's claims had to be evaluated in light of the proce-
dural history of his case, which spanned almost a decade.' 49 The
Court outlined the abundant constitutional provisions that ensure
against the conviction an innocent person, including the rights to a
presumption of innocence, to confront adverse witnesses, to com-
pulsory process, to effective assistance of counsel, to ajury trial, and
to a "fair trial in a fair tribunal."' 50 The Court recognized the pros-
ecution's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the
requirement that the prosecution disclose exculpatory evidence as
additional safeguards.' 5 ' Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that
143 Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 859 (1993).
144 ChiefJustice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice O'Connor con-
curred and filed an opinion in which Justice Kennedy joined. Justice Scalia concurred
and filed and opinion in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice White filed an opinion
concurring in judgement.
145 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 859.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 859-60 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (presumption of inno-
cence); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (confrontation of adverse witness); Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (compulsory process); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984) (effective assistance of counsel); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
(jury trial); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("fair trial in a fair tribunal")).
151 Id (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (reasonable doubt); Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (exculpatory evidence).
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capital cases demand special procedures, such as the requirement
that the jury be given the option of convicting the defendant of a
lesser offense, because of the nature of the penalty at stake. 152 Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained that these constitutional provisions ex-
ist to make it difficult for the State to overturn a criminal defend-
ant's presumption of innocence. 15  According to the Court, these
provisions grant each defendant the procedural safeguards required
by due process of law.154 However, since the presumption of inno-
cence lasts only until a defendant's conviction, "in the eyes of the
law, [Herrera did] not come before the Court as one who is 'inno-
cent,' but on the contrary as one who has been convicted by due
process of law of two brutal murders."' 55
Herrera, though, did not challenge the state court's finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented at
trial.' 56 Instead, he argued that new evidence, not available at trial,
proved his innocence. 157 ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that habeas
courts historically could not correct errors of fact, 158 and proceeded
to review more recent authority. 15 9 Of all the Supreme Court's
cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that Jackson v. Virginia 160 came
as close as any to authorizing evidentiary review on federal habeas
appeal. 16 1 However, the Chief Justice rejected the contention that
Jackson authorized an evidentiary review of the state court conviction
in Herrera's case. 16 2 While Jackson held that a federal habeas court
may review a claim "that the evidence adduced at a state trial was
not sufficient to convict a criminal beyond a reasonable doubt,"'16





157 Id. at 858.
158 See, e.g., ExparteTerry, 128 U.S. 289, 305 (1888) and cases cited supra notes 14-16
and accompanying text.
159 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 861 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)
("Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials."); Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 90 (1983) (verdicts in state criminal trials are "a decisive and portentous
event")).
160 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
161 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 861.
162 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that Herrera's claim that newly discovered
evidence proved him innocent was not cognizable in Texas courts either. Id. at 860.
Texas law requires a defendant to file a motion within 30 days after imposition or sus-
pension of sentence to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. TEx. R.
App. PROC. 31 (a)(1). Since Herrera's claim of actual innocence was made nearly ten
years after his conviction, he presented no cause of action to the Texas courts. Herrera,
113 S. Ct. at 860.
163 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 861.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that this does not allow a re-
viewing court to draw its own conclusion from the evidence.' 64 In-
stead, the role of the habeas court is to determine whether "any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 165 In addition, Chief Justice
Rehnquist distinguished Jackson from Herrera in that the former au-
thorized review of record evidence: 'Jackson does not extend to
nonrecord evidence, including newly discovered evidence."' 166
The majority based its decision refusing federal habeas review
to actual innocence claims in part on the need for finality in capital
decisions. The Court reasoned that to allow new evidence to be
heard would also require the habeas court to re-hear the testimony
presented at trial. 167 Additional discovery would often have to be
allowed. The Court found that such a re-hearing would damage the
integrity of the trial court process as well as incur considerable ex-
pense.168 In addition, there would be no guarantee that the result-
ing verdict would be any more correct than that of the original
trial.169 "[T]he passage of time only diminishes the reliability of
criminal adjudications,"1 70 and the Court did not want to place the
district court "in the . . . difficult position of having to weigh the
probative value of 'hot' and 'cold' evidence on the petitioner's guilt
or innocence."' 71
Chief Justice Rehnquist also found a procedural bar to hearing
Herrera's actual innocence claim. Looking to its recent habeas ju-
risprudence, the Court found that the "fundamental miscarriage of
justice exception is available only where the prisoner supplements his
constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual inno-
cence."1 72 The Court refused to expand the narrow exception to
allow actual innocence itself to be a constitutional claim. Instead,
the Court held that actual innocence is "a gateway through which a
habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitu-
tional claim considered on the merits."' 173 Herrera's claim of actual
innocence did not include the procedural error required to bring a
164 Id.
165 Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
166 Id
167 Id.
168 Id. at 861.
169 Id. at 862.
170 Id. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468 (1991); United States v.
Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 476 (1947).
171 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862.






The Court rejected Herrera's assertion that his actual inno-
cence claim deserved special consideration because he was on death
row. The Court reiterated its refusal "to hold that the fact that a
death sentence has been imposed requires a different standard of
review on federal habeas corpus."' 175 While the Eighth Amendment
requires that the death penalty be imposed only through a process
that reliably prevents wrongful execution,1 76 the Court reasoned
that a new trial nearly a decade after the original was unlikely to add
to the reliability of the outcome.' 77
The Court likewise found no rationale to grant Herrera's sug-
gestion that it vacate his death sentence without overturning his
conviction. Although Ford v. Wainwright 178 held that the Eighth
Amendment requires certain procedural protections in sanity deter-
minations to prevent the execution of the insane, the Chief Justice
distinguished between Ford's challenge to the constitutionality of his
conviction and Herrera's challenge of the validity of his own.' 79
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that questions of punishment, not
guilt, are "properly examined within the purview of the Eighth
Amendment."' 80 As the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execu-
tion of the insane, a determination of sanity prior to execution is
timely. 181 A determination of guilt or innocence many years after
the trial, however, imperils "the high regard for truth that befits a
decision affecting the life or death of a human being."'18 2
The Court also rejected Herrera's alternative claim that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled him to either
a new trial or a vacation of his death sentence.' 8 3 Citing the Court's
historical willingness to grant substantial deference to the states in
174 Id.
175 Id. at 863 (quoting Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (plurality opinion),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 827 (1990)).
176 See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
177 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 863.
178 477 U.S. 399 (1986). In Ford, the petitioner was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death. While there was no question as to his mental competency at either the
time of his offense, his trial or his sentencing, subsequent behavior raised doubts about
his sanity. The U.S. Supreme Court required the state to provide an additional hearing
to determine his competency. The Court held that the petitioner could not be executed
if he were incapable of understanding the punishment he was going to suffer and the
rationale for the punishment. Id. at 422-23.
179 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 863.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 411).
183 Id. at 864.
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matters of criminal procedure, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained
that the Court has found criminal process lacking only where it of-
fends a fundamental principle of justice.' 8 4 The Court looked to
historical practice to determine "whether a procedural rule can be
characterized as fundamental."' 8 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist showed
that while granting new trials based on newly discovered evidence
has common law roots, limitations on their timeliness have an
equally long history.' 86 Reviewing the two-year time limit for filing
new trial motions in federal court,18 7 and the states' time limits,
which range from within sixty days ofjudgment to over three years
after conviction,188 the Court found no fundamental offense in
Texas' thirty-day limit for new trial motions based on newly discov-
ered evidence.18 9
The Chief Justice noted that Herrera is not without a forum to
raise his actual innocence claim. Clemency, according to the Court,
"is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages ofjustice where
judicial process has been exhausted."' 90 All thirty-six states that
permit capital punishment have constitutional or statutory clemency
provisions.' 9 ' Under Texas law, the individual sentenced to death,
his or her representative, or the Governor may request clemency
consideration by the Board of Pardons and Paroles.19 2 With the rec-
ommendation of a majority of the Board, the Governor may grant
clemency.' 93 Specific guidelines exist for pardons based on inno-
cence as well.' 9 4 Clemency, according to the Court, "has provided
184 Id. (citing Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2577 (1992)).
185 Id. (quoting Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2577).
186 Id. at 864-65. The common law originally allowed the granting of a new trial "only
during the term of court in which the final judgment was entered." Id. That rule was
later changed several times by statute to 60 days after final judgement, to any time
before execution, and to the current two year limit. Id. at 865.
187 FED. R. CRIM. P. 33.
188 At the time Herrera was decided, seventeen states required that a new trial motion
based on newly discovered evidence be brought within 60 days ofjudgment; one state
adhered to the common law rule, which allows a new trial to be granted only during the
term of court in which the final judgment was entered; 18 jurisdictions had time limits
ranging from one to three years, and 15 states allowed motions to be brought more than
three years after conviction. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 865-66.
189 ld
190 Id. at 866.
191 Id at 867.
192 TEX. CONST., art. IV, § 11; Tax. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., Art 48.01 (West 1979).
193 Id
194 The applicable statute reads:
On the grounds of innocence of the offense for which convicted the board will only
consider applications for recommendation to the governor for full pardon upon
receipt of: (1) a written unanimous recommendation of the current trial officials of
the court of conviction; and/or (2) a certified order or judgment of a court having
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the 'fail safe' in our criminal justice system."' 195 The Court noted
that Herrera had not yet applied for a pardon on the grounds of
innocence or otherwise.' 96
The majority opinion concluded with the argument that in a
capital case, a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence"
made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconsti-
tutional.1 97 Such a case would warrant federal habeas relief if no
state avenue were open to process the claim. 198 The Court hypothe-
sized that the threshold showing would have to be extraordinarily
high because of the tremendous burden that re-trying cases based
on stale evidence would place on the states, and because of the great
need for finality in capital cases. 199
Without articulating what the standard for review in such a case
might be, the Court stated that the showing made by Herrera fell far
short of the threshold. 200 The Court explained that new trial mo-
tions based on affidavits alone are generally disfavored, as there is
no opportunity either to cross-examine the affiants or to assess their
credibility. 20 1  Further, the Court reasoned, Herrera's affidavits
were particularly suspect since they were based mainly on hearsay,
contained inconsistencies, were provided at the "1 I th hour" with-
out an explanation for the delay, blamed a dead man, and gave no
rationale for why Herrera pleaded guilty to the murder of Officer
Rucker. 20 2 The Court noted that had the evidence been provided at
trial, it could have been weighed by the jury in making its factual
determination.20 3 "But coming 10 years after petitioner's trial, this
showing of innocence falls far short of that which would have to be
made in order to trigger the sort of constitutional claim which we
have assumed, arguendo, to exist." 20 4
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment as well as with
Chief Justice Rehnquist's hypothetical argument that executing the
jurisdiction accompanied by certified copy of the findings of fact (if any); and (3)
affidavits of witnesses upon which the finding of innocence is based.
TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 37, § 143.2 (1992).
195 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 868.











legally and factually innocent would be unconstitutional. 20 5 She
found in the instant matter, however, that Herrera was "not inno-
cent, in any sense of the word."'206 As Herrera was convicted by a
jury of his peers, he did not come before the Court as an innocent
man mistakenly sentenced to death.207 She argued that Herrera was
"instead a legally guilty [man] who, refusing to accept the jury's ver-
dict, demands a hearing in which to have his culpability determined
once again. ' 208 Justice O'Connor reiterated the Court's opinion
that federal courts should not intervene to prevent an execution
once a prisoner has been convicted following a constitutionally
adequate trial. 209 The sole remedy available in such cases is
clemency.2 10
Justice O'Connor's concurrence focused on the insubstantial
nature of the evidence offerred by Herrera and the troubling man-
ner in which it was presented. Affidavits, she explained, are not un-
common in capital cases and are not regarded as reliable: "when a
prisoner's life is at stake, he often can find someone new to vouch
for him." 211 Justice O'Connor reasoned that Herrera's affidavits
were no exception, for they were produced eight years after his con-
viction, and without any reasonable excuse for the delay.2 12 Worse,
they blamed Raul Sr., a dead man who could "neither contest the
allegations nor suffer punishment because of them." 213 Justice
O'Connor argued that none of the new evidence presented re-
motely explained the most damaging evidence produced against
Herrera at trial-the signed letter in which he confessed and offered
to turn himself in.214 Since there was no question of Herrera's guilt
in Justice O'Connor's mind, she reasoned that the Court had no
need to decide "whether federal courts may entertain convincing
claims of actual innocence. That difficult question remains open. If
the Constitution's guarantees of fair procedure and the safeguards
of clemency and pardon fulfill their historical mission, it may never
require resolution at all."215
205 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy joined Justice O'Connor.
206 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
207 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
208 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
209 Id at 871 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
210 Id (O'Connor, J., concurring).
211 Id. at 872 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
213 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
214 Id at 873 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
215 Id at 874 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Scaliajoined the majority opinion in its entirety, but dis-
agreed with Justice Rehnquist's assumption, made only for the sake
of argument, that a constitutional right to a new trial would exist if
there were compelling new evidence of innocence.2 16 Justice Scalia
noted that the question for which the Court granted certiorari-
whether the execution of a person convicted in a full and fair trial,
who later alleges that new evidence proves his actual innocence, vio-
lates due process or constitutes cruel and unusual punishment-was
never answered by the Court.2 17 Justice Scalia answered the certio-
rari question with an unequivocal "no." According to Justice Scalia,
"[t]here is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary prac-
tice (if that were enough), for finding in the Constitution a right to
demand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of in-
nocence brought forward after a conviction. '21 8
Justice Scalia explained that the Court made its hypothetical ar-
gument only to rationalize the harsh outcome that constitutional
analysis of the question requires. 219 Justice Scalia implored the
lower courts not to engage in hypothetical analysis similar to the
majority's in the instant matter. Instead, lower courts, when faced
with actual innocence claims, should follow the Court's Townsend
holding that newly discovered evidence relevant to a state prisoner's
guilt or innocence, unaccompanied by an underlying constitutional
violation, is not a basis for federal habeas corpus relief.220
D. JUSTICE WHITE'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice White joined the majority's judgment and agreed with
Chief Justice Rehnquist's assumption that a "persuasive showing of
'actual innocence' " would render the execution of a convict uncon-
stitutional. 22 1 Justice White further articulated a standard by which
newly discovered evidence could be measured to determine whether
the petitioner would be entitled to relief: a petitioner would be re-
quired to show at the very least that "based on [the] proffered newly
discovered evidence and the entire record before the jury that con-
victed him, 'no rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt be-
216 Id. at 874 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia.
217 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
218 Id. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
219 Id. at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring).
220 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)).
221 Id. (White, J., concurring).
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yond a reasonable doubt.' "222
E. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S DISSENTING OPINION
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun223 explained that
the district court, not the Supreme Court, should decide whether
Herrera is entitled to a hearing and to relief on the merits of his
claim.224 According to Justice Blackmun, the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment reflects society's
evolving standard of decency, and the execution of an innocent per-
son is at "odds with contemporary standards .... ,225 He argued
that nothing could be more "shocking to the conscience" than to
execute a person who is actually innocent.226 Justice Blackmun
found that execution of the innocent is equally offensive to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 227 He argued that
the majority misinterpreted Herrera's claim as one of procedural
due process, when in fact he was raising a substantive due process
challenge. 228 According to Justice Blackmun, substantive due pro-
cess, like the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition, precludes
the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the con-
science. 229 To Justice Blackmun, the lethal injection of an innocent
man falls within that category of behavior. 230
Having found that the Constitution prohibits the execution of
the actually innocent, Justice Blackmun argued that "[t]he possibil-
ity of executive clemency is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. '" 23 1 "A pardon is an act
of grace.... The vindication of rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion has never been made to turn on the unreviewable discretion of
an executive official or administrative tribunal. '23 2
Justice Blackmun then outlined the procedure that should be
followed by a state prisoner to make an actual innocence claim. He
explained that the state court is the proper forum for hearing a
222 Id. (White, J., concurring) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)
(second alteration in original)).
223 Justice Blackmun was joined in Parts I-IV by Justices Stevens and Souter.
224 Id- at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
225 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465
(1984)).
226 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172
(1952)).
227 Id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
228 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229 Id at 879 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172).
230 Id. at 876 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
231 Id. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
232 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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claim of actual innocence. 238 A prisoner would be required to ex-
haust all state judicial procedures before taking his or her claim of
actual innocence to federal court.234 Provided the petitioner had
exhausted his state remedies, the district court could summarily dis-
miss the petition if it appeared on its face that the petitioner was not
entitled to relief.2 35 Justice Blackmun argued that if the petition
raised factual questions, as did Herrera's, the district court would be
required to provide a full and fair hearing.2 36
Justice Blackmun further argued that the petitioner must show
that he or she probably is innocent to be granted relief on an actual
innocence claim based on new evidence. 237 As the passage of time
could make it difficult to re-try a defendant, "an otherwise constitu-
tionally valid conviction or sentence should not be set aside
lightly." 238 Placing the burden on the prisoner would create a pre-
sumption that the conviction is valid. No further presumptions
would be needed regarding the general reliability of newly discov-
ered evidence. 23 9 Thus, the probable innocence standard would
protect the integrity of the resulting decision.240
According to Justice Blackmun, "the court charged with decid-
ing such a claim should make a case-by-case determination about
the reliability of the newly discovered evidence under the circum-
stances."' 24 ' A prisoner raising an actual innocence claim would not
be entitled to discovery as a matter of right.242 Instead, the district
court would retain discretion to order discovery when it would aid
the court in making "a reliable determination with respect to the
prisoner's claim."' 243 Applying this standard to the facts of Herrera,
Justice Blackmun would have reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remanded the case to the district court "to consider
whether the petitioner had shown, in light of all the evidence, that
he was probably actually innocent. '244
233 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
234 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
235 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
236 Id. at 881-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,
313 (1962)).
237 Id. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
238 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
239 Id. at 883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
240 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
241 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
242 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 295 (1969).
243 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Harris, 394 U.S. at 299-300).




A. DENIAL OF HABEAS REVIEW FOLLOWS PRECEDENT
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his majority opinion with the
statement that "the central purpose of any system of criminal justice
is to convict the guilty and free the innocent.... In any system of
criminal justice, [however,] 'innocence' or 'guilt' must be deter-
mined in some sort of a judicial proceeding. ' 245 His conclusion in
Herrera v. Collins flows directly from this central tenet that judicial
procedures exist to enable fact finders to accurately determine the
truth, and is supported by the Court's past procedural limitations on
federal habeas review.
246
With Wainwright v. Sykes, the Court initiated a line of cases that
created formidable hurdles for state habeas petitioners to have their
claims reviewed by federal courts. In addition to the Sykes "cause
and prejudice" requirement, these hurdles include the restricted re-
view of Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims; 247 impedi-
ments to hearing successive, 248  abusive,249  and defaulted
petitions;250 strict adherence to the exhaustion requirement 251 and
to state procedural rules;252 and a bar on applying new constitu-
tional principles retroactively. 255 A narrow exception to these pro-
245 Id. at 859 (citations omitted).
246 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2529 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) ("Only last term I had occasion to lament the Court's continuing 'crusade to erect
petty procedural barriers in the path of any state prisoner seeking review of his federal
constitutional claims ... ').
247 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). In Stone, the Court held that federal
habeas relief is not available for a claim that evidence was admitted at trial in violation of
the Fourth Amendment protection against search and seizure unless the state court de-
nied an opportunity for a full and adequate hearing on the Fourth Amendment claim.
Id.
248 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
249 An abusive claim is a new claim, not previously raised at state trial; bringing such a
claim upon habeas review is considered an abuse of the writ. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant,
111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468 (1991).
250 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
251 A federal court may not grant a habeas petition "unless it appears that the appli-
cant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is
either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b) (1988). The Court has more strictly enforced the exhaustion requirement by
holding that petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims should be dis-
missed. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982).
252 In Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2552-53 (1991), the Court denied re-
view of a capital habeas petitioner's case because his lawyer had filed the state habeas
petition three days late. Id at 2552-53, 2565.
253 The Court's retroactivity doctrine holds that even preserved and convincing
claims of constitutional error cannot be heard in habeas if they depend upon constitu-
tional precedent that did not exist when a petitioner's case cleared the direct review
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cedural restrictions applies if a petitioner can make a colorable
showing of actual innocence.
In Herrera, Chief Justice Rehnquist made a sound and logical
argument that led to his conclusion that the actual innocence excep-
tion does not apply: the Constitution provides no federal habeas
relief for a post-conviction claim of actual innocence not grounded
in a procedural constitutional violation.25 4 He persuasively demon-
strated that federal habeas case law has not historically treated ac-
tual innocence claims as independent constitutional violations, as
Herrera argued. Instead, the Court's review of cases shows that a
prisoner may use an actual innocence claim only as a basis for hav-
ing his or her otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on
its merits. 25 5 As the error in Herrera was in the outcome of the state
trial-the trial court's finding of guilt-and no violation of constitu-
tional procedure was claimed, there is nothing unconstitutional
about either Herrera's incarceration or death sentence. "[T]he er-
ror lies only in the result, and guilt or innocence is not a constitu-
tional question." 256
Several themes emerge from the Court's recent death penalty
decisions that predict both the outcome of Herrera and an increasing
number of executions in death penalty cases generally.257 First, by
strictly interpreting the old barriers to habeas review and erecting
additional hurdles, the Court has dramatically decreased the role of
federal courts in reviewing capital cases. 25 8 Second, the Court has
tried to clarify its capital punishment jurisprudence to enable state
compliance and decrease the need for federal supervision. 259 To do
so, the Court has stated its constitutional death penalty concerns in
"formalistic terms that set predictable, attainable, and easily policed
standards of behavior." 260 Although legal clarity is desired by the
Court, a third trend is in the Court's willingness to defer clear stan-
dards whenever their attainment would require either the state to
compromise a legitimate interest or the Court to grant upon an ac-
cused more protection than that necessary to secure a constitutional
process. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion). For a thorough
review of the Court's retroactivity rules, see Lori Bienstock, Note, Federal Habeas Corpus:
The New Standard of Retroactivity, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 865 (1991).
254 Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869 (1993).
255 Id.
256 Judge Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, The Death Penalty, and The Harris Case,
102 YALE L.J. 205, 216 (1992).
257 Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 1643, 1650 (1993).
258 Id. at 1650-52. See also supra notes 247-53 and accompanying text.




right.26 1 The resulting standards are thus broad enough to enable a
state to enforce its interests yet fact-dependent enough to minimize
the risk of federal reversal.2 62
Within this framework, although Herrera was the Court's first
opportunity to determine whether habeas review applies to a case in
which no constitutional violation was claimed, the Court's result is
an entirely logical extension of past precedent and is consistent with
its current position on federal habeas: "liberal availability of the
federal habeas corpus remedy must yield to considerations of com-
ity, federalism, and finality in judgements." 263 Thus, the Herrera de-
cision indicates that "[a] sleeker death penalty jurisprudence, built
more for speed and efficiency than for normative safety, is coming
on line .... [E]xecutions are on the rise." 264
B. THE HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENT
To those who value a more substantive interpretation of habeas
review,265 the Herrera decision is disheartening. However, there is
some hope in the language of the decision that such an interpreta-
tion is not altogether gone. "[T]he Court has [long] struggled to
resolve the tension between a narrow focus on death-penalty proce-
dures and the (substantive) view that federal judges have a responsi-
bility to prevent state-imposed death sentences from being carried
out when such sentences are undeserved." 266 The Court's Herrera
decision reflects just this tension. Having previously stated that the
role of the habeas court is "to ensure that individuals are not impris-
261 Id. at 1654.
262 Id. at 1655.
263 Mary Ann Snow, Comment, Lundy, Isaac and Frady: A Trilogy of Habeas Corpus Re-
straint, 32 CATm. U. L. REV. 169, 185 (1982). See also Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas
Corpus: A Complex Procedurefora Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1018 (1993) ("The
majority of the Justices has sacrificed constitutional fairness to reinforce its present con-
cern over the finality of the state judgment.").
264 Bilionis, supra note 257, at 1659.
265 Those in favor of more liberal habeas review argue that federal habeas jurisdiction
is concerned only with the constitutionality of confinement, not the procedure with
which the claim was brought.
The jurisdictional prerequisite [to habeas corpus] is not the judgment of a state
court but detention simpli-ter ... Habeas lies to enforce the right of personal lib-
erty; when that right is denied and a person confined, the federal court has the
power to release him. Indeed, it has no other power; it cannot revise the state court
judgment; it can only act on the body of the petitioner.
Fayv. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-31 (1963), abrogated by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct.
2546 (1991). See also Timothy J. Foley, The New Arbitrariness: Procedural Default of Federal
Habeas Corpus Claims in Capital Cases, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 193, 205-07 (1989).
266 Joseph L. Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the'U.S. Supreme Court's Con-




oned in violation of the Constitution-not to correct errors of
fact,"'267 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, albeit in dicta, that "a
truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial
would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and
[would] warrant federal habeas relief ... *"268 Thus, Herrera re-
quires habeas courts to consider the merits of each criminal case
when contemplating awarding habeas relief. By requiring the sub-
stantive analysis of each case, "the Court may be able to .. .em-
power the federal courts to perform (at least in a limited fashion)
the important substantive function of separating those state death-
row inmates who truly deserve the death penalty ... from those who
do not." 269
Chief Justice Rehnquist's assumption, made for the sake of ar-
gument toward the close of his opinion, is at odds with his logical
conclusion that no habeas relief would be available to claims of in-
nocence unaccompanied by an underlying constitutional violation.
However, it is consistent with the Court's recent desire to leave
open a path for substantive habeas review. As the Rehnquist Court
has created increasingly stringent procedural barriers to federal
habeas relief, it has also provided narrow exceptions for truly ex-
traordinary claims. The Court's current interpretation of actual in-
nocence is just such an exception. In Smith v. Murray,270 the Court
recognized that a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs when-
ever there is a substantial claim that a procedural error undermined
the accuracy of the sentencing decision.271 Since Smith, however,
the Court has determined that the broad actual innocence exception
defined in that case would turn the "extraordinary case," in which a
fundamental miscarriage of justice is proven, "into an all too ordi-
nary one. ' 272 The actual innocence standard defined in Sawyer v.
Whitley is intended to provide a narrow outlet to ensure that the ex-
ception does not become the rule. Likewise, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's hypothetical in Herrera leaves a way out for the truly
exceptional case that cannot be reached by the existing, narrowly-
defined, procedural actual innocence exception.
Justices' Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, White, Scalia, and
Thomas all agreed to the dismissal of Herrera's claim without au-
thorizing review. The new evidence offered by Herrera in his
267 Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860 (1993).
268 Id. at 869.
269 Hoffmann, supra note 266, at 820.
270 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
271 Id. at 538-39.
272 Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410 n.6 (1989).
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habeas petition, consisting mainly of affidavits that blamed a dead
man, 273 did bring out some significant questions of fact that were
never resolved.27 4 However, as both Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor noted in the majority opinion and her concur-
rence respectively, none of the evidence provided an explanation
for either Herrera's letter of confession or the eight-year delay in
bringing the new evidence to the attention of the Court.275 Notably,
even the dissentingJustices made no finding that Herrera's evidence
was compelling proof of innocence. Instead, the dissent argued that
the Court should agree with the district court that "petitioner's evi-
dence was [not] so insubstantial that it could be dismissed without
any hearing at all." 27 6
In making the hypothetical argument, the ChiefJustice caused a
split within the majority. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and White
ground their conclusions in the Chief Justice's hypothetical argu-
ment.277 Although they rejected Herrera's showing, they asserted
that a constitutional right to habeas review exists where a truly com-
pelling showing is made.278 Justices Scalia and Thomas, however,
would hold that there is never a constitutional right to have newly
discovered evidence of actual innocence heard. 279 While the major-
ity continues to vocally reject a substantive reading of the constitu-
tional provisions, the other Justices firmly reject the strict
procedural interpretation of habeas relief offered by Justices Scalia
and Thomas. Thus, the hypothetical argument paves the way for a
truly extraordinary case to be heard on its merits.
C. THE ANSWER TO THE CERTIORARI QUESTION,
As Herrera's claim was found to contain no "truly persuasive"
showing of actual innocence by six of theJustices, regardless of what
standard might be required to define such a showing, the constitu-
tional question presented on certiorari was never reached. The
ChiefJustice offers no constitutional justification for his affirmative,
albeit hypothetical, answer to the certiorari question of whether
273 See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
274 The affidavit of Hector Villareal, Raul Herrera, Sr.'s lawyer, attested that Herrera
and his brother were involved in a drug-trafficking scheme that included the Hidalgo
County Sheriff. The affidavit further claimed that Raul Sr. was killed in an effort to
silence him by an agent of the sheriff who was present when Raul Sr. murdered Officers
Rucker and Carrisalez. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 858 n.2 (1993).
275 See supra notes 200-02, 211-14 and accompanying text.
276 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
277 See supra notes 205, 221 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 205, 221 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
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habeas review might be awarded to a claim of actual innocence
brought following a procedurally adequate trial. He cannot do so
because, as Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion correctly argues,
taking the reasoning of the Court to its logical end allows for no
such constitutional justification. 2 0
Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Stevens also conclude that the
Constitution provides an avenue for the federal habeas review of
actual innocence claims based on post-conviction evidence. Unlike
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and White, however, these
dissenting Justices base their conclusion on constitutional princi-
ples. The dissent argues that a substantive interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment, as well as substantive due process accorded by the Fourteenth
Amendment, provide the necessary constitutional authority to grant
federal habeas review of actual innocence claims based on newly dis-
covered evidence that do not allege additional procedural viola-
tions.28 1 Thus, in total, seven Justices find a constitutional right to
federal habeas relief.28 2 Only three283 justify that right. Should a
case come before the Court with more compelling evidence point-
ing toward a claim of actual innocence, it is likely that the majority
opinion will more closely follow the Herrera dissent.
Should such a case reach the Court, the adoption of either Jus-
tice White's or Justice Blackmun's standard would produce a similar
result. Justice White's standard to enable a petitioner to receive
habeas review requires a "persuasive showing of 'actual inno-
cence.' "284 Justice Blackmun's standard requires only that the peti-
tion raise a factual question.28 5 Under the White standard, the
threshold showing for granting habeas review is quite high. So is
the standard by which the evidence would be measured. According
to Justice White, the petitioner would not be granted relief unless a
review of both the newly discovered evidence and the trial record
showed that "no rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt." 28 6
280 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("There is no basis in text,
tradition, or even in contemporary practice... for finding in the Constitution a right to
demand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought for-
ward after conviction.").
281 See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
282 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, White, Blackmun, Sou-
ter, and Stevens.
283 Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Stevens.
284 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
285 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
286 Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 875 (1993) (White, J., concurring) (quoting
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (alteration in original)).
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The Blackmun standard, on the other hand, would compel
habeas review of any case that raised a factual question so long as all
state judicial procedures had been exhausted. Justice Blackmun's
standard for habeas relief, however, is equally burdensome for the
petitioner; the petitioner must show that he "probably is inno-
cent."' 287 Like the standard articulated by Justice White, Justice
Blackmun's standard creates a presumption that the underlying con-
viction is valid. Since authorizing new discovery would be left to the
discretion of the district court under the Blackmun standard, as
under that articulated by Justice White, the petitioner would often
be required to show his probable innocence based only on the newly
discovered evidence and the trial record. Given the narrow inter-
pretation of the actual innocence exception in habeas cases to
date,288 it is unlikely that under either standard any but the most
compelling showing of actual innocence would result in the pris-
oner's release upon habeas review.
In the meantime, clemency, the "fail-safe" procedure to pre-
vent execution of the actually innocent, may take on a more funda-
mental role in insuring the accuracy of the outcome of judicial
proceedings. 28 9 Indeed, the limitations on federal habeas review
have spurred a re-examination of capital clemency. 290 It has been
argued that "the revitalization of clemency is not merely a matter of
choice.... [M]eaningful clemency review is a governor's constitu-
tional obligation. ' 29 1 As the Court continues to narrow the means
by which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas review, clem-
ency may indeed be the only means by which a prisoner who makes
a substantial showing of actual innocence may gain relief.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Herrera, the Rehnquist Court continued its current practice
of aggressively narrowing access to federal courts for criminal de-
fendants in death penalty cases. 292 Given the Rehnquist Court's
287 Id. at 882 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); see also supra note 237 and accompanying text.
288 See supra note 54.
289 Following the Court's Herrera decision, a Texas court for the first time ordered the
State Board of Pardons and Paroles to hear a death row inmate's evidence of actual
innocence. Marcia Coyle, Inmate Granted Unique Hearing, NAT'L. LJ., Aug. 16, 1993, at 3.
290 See, e.g., Hugo A. Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 225 (1990-91); Margery Malkin Koosed, Some Perspectives on the
Possible Impact of Diminished Federal Review of Ohio Death Sentences, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 695
(1990); Paul Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99 YALE
LJ. 389 (1989).
291 Bilionis, supra note 257, at 1698.
292 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Is the Rehnquist Court Really That Conservative?: An Analysis of
the 1991-92 Term, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 987, 999 (1993).
1994] 973
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
philosophy that procedural protections alone may prevent wrongful
executions, and its concern that any greater protection undermines
the judicial process and only results in delays, 293 the Court predict-
ably ruled that there is no right to federal habeas review of an actual
innocence claim not grounded in an underlying constitutional viola-
tion. The Court did create a narrow exeception for substantive re-
view, however, by acknowledging that if a truly compelling showing
of actual innocence is made, the Constitution would prohibit the ex-
ecution of an innocent person.
This Note asserts that the Court's exception to its reasoned
conclusion that no constitutional right to habeas review of this case
exists is consistent with the Court's recent history of leaving open
narrow access for substantive review of truly exceptional cases.
Whether this actual innocence exception to its general prohibition
against habeas review will in fact provide protection for wrongly in-
carcerated death row inmates, however, remains to be determined.
In the immediate future, it is hoped that other remedies, such as
more careful decisions by state courts and more meaningful clem-
ency policies by state governors, will make up for the stringent lim-
its on federal habeas review imposed by the Rehnquist Court.
JENNIFER BREUER
293 See id. at 1000.
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